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1.INTRODUCTION
The increasing integration of capital markets that characterized the last two decades is seen as hav-
ing implications on the individual governments' ability to tax capital income. Since the tax base is 
more and more mobile, tax revenues are more sensitive to changes in the tax rate, also. Therefore 
we have witnessed a growing consensus, namely in regions that share some supranational decision 
making, and where the intra-area mobility is higher, for the desirability of coordinated ﬁ  scal policies, 
in particular on capital taxation. In practice, however, very few steps have been taken to harmonize 
capital taxation. This lack of coordination would lead us to expect a "race to the bottom" as a result 
of ﬁ  scal competition, which would imply a negligible tax revenue from capital taxation. Although we 
can observe as a general trend a small decline of the share of tax revenues from capital over time, 
that decline is not the one that economic theory would anticipate. This fact is even more puzzling 
when we take into account that the tax on capital income, when compared either with the tax on labor 
income or the value-added tax, is much more inefﬁ  cient. This is a well known and robust result in the 
literature.1 Taxing capital imposes a negative incentive on saving (that is, an intertemporal distortion 
since it taxes more heavily future than current consumption). This characteristic is worsened with the 
double, or sometimes triple, capital taxation that characterizes most ﬁ  scal codes. Social welfare is 
usually pointed out as the reason for the relatively high taxes on capital income, due to the undesir-
able effects on equity that a decline of those taxes could deliver, namely when compensated by an 
increase of labor taxation. Therefore, the existing situation can be seen as an implicit and partial co-
ordination system, since different countries have different levels for capital taxes. This arrangement 
is supported by the argument that lower taxes would have a positive impact on efﬁ  ciency, at the cost 
of penalizing the poorest of each economy. This equity loss is a cost that most countries would not 
want to pay.
In this article we want to test whether this thesis is supported by the economic theory and by the 
empirical characterization of different households, in developed economies as well as in emergent 
countries, which are entering in the international capital markets.
The background work of this article2 aims at reconciling the apparently conﬂ  icting results of two con-
(1)  Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) are the seminal works on this subject.
(2)  See Correia (2010).
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tributions to the literature. The ﬁ  rst is the quite well known result of Arnold Harberger (1995),3 that 
an increase of capital taxation would lead to a decline in wages, in a general equilibrium model of a 
small open economy. This article differs from Harberger (1995) since we consider that the change in 
capital taxes must be compensated by a change in an alternative tax. We assume that it is the tax 
on labor that is adjusted to guarantee that the total tax revenue is invariant. The second one is that 
of Garcia-Milá et al. (2001). These authors consider a closed economy model with heterogeneous 
households. Their conclusion is that the elimination of the capital income tax, when compensated 
by an increase of the tax on labor income, decreases the welfare of the households in the left side 
of the welfare distribution, that is the poorest of the economy. As the poorest households have labor 
income as the main source for ﬁ  nancing of consumption, if wages would increase, as in Harberger 
(1995) with the elimination of capital taxation, it may not be the case that they would suffer in terms 
of welfare. This is the literature dilemma that this article tries to clarify.
2. THE MODEL
The model represents a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, that is an economy inte-
grated in a global capital market. It is a real economy in the sense that we abstract from money as 
a facilitator of transactions. There is just one good produced in every period, this good is identical to 
the one produced in the rest of the world and there are no restrictions to the tradability of this good. 
The available technology uses as inputs capital, K, and labor measured in units of efﬁ  ciency, EN, 
where N represents hours of work and E is an index of labor efﬁ  ciency. We assume that markets 
are competitive. This assumption and the production function characteristics imply that real wages 
(in units of consumption), as well as the real cost of capital, depend only on the capital/labor ratio 
used in equilibrium by each ﬁ  rm. We can also say that the real wage depends positively on that ratio 
while the cost of capital (as its equilibrium rentability) depends negatively on the same ratio.4 The 
produced good can be used  in the small open economy for private consumption, for investment or 
for government consumption or to export to the rest of the world. The government spends a constant 
ﬂ  ow of per capita expenditures, G  and taxes labor and capital income, at the proportional tax rates 
τn  and τk respectively. The assumption that the system of taxing capital income is the territorial 
system implies that the income of external assets held by domestic households,
∗ B  is not subject to 
taxation. The real net return of these assets is the net international real interest rate,  . r
∗  By assuming 
that this rate is constant we are imposing that the rest of the world is stationary. We also assume that 
fundamentals in the rest of the world are identical to the ones of the small economy. These assump-
tions imply that, with no costs of adjustment of capital, the economy will converge immediately to the 
new stationary state, following the change of policy.
As the objective of this article is to understand the different effects that the change of policy can 
have on different households that live in the small open economy, it is important to characterize 
(3)  This paper considers an increase of the tax rate on coorporate taxation. The bulk of the paper contemplates a small open economy environment. I has a 
section were the results are extended to the US economy, that is to a closed economy.
(4)  These properties derive from the production function being neoclassical and markets competitive.Articles  |  Spring 2010
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the intrinsic heterogeneity of households, which leads them to suffer differently the effects of the 
change of policy. Then we will assume that households differ on labor efﬁ  ciency and in the stock of 
non-human wealth that they hold at the time of the reform. Each household i has a labor efﬁ  ciency 
level measured by Ei and holds wealth in physical capital, Ki domestic bonds, Bi and external as-
sets  B  i 
.  Agents are identical in every other characteristic. To apply the method described in Correia 
(1999) we assume that preferences are such that it is possible to deﬁ  ne a representative household.5 
Moreover, and given cross section empirical evidence, we propose the type of preferences GHH,6 
which are characterized by labor supply decisions in every period reacting just to the real wage of that 
period, and not reacting to the current or expect household's wealth. These preferences imply that if 
rich households work more than poor one it is just because that have a higher labor efﬁ  ciency index.




















where Cit and Nit represent the consumption and hours of work of agent i in period t.
This household is constrained in its choices by the intertemporal budget constraint, which can be 
written as:
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where r0 is the net rate of return in period zero, wt is the net wage rate at period t and Ai0 the initial 
wealth, is deﬁ  ned as  000 . iii KBB ∗ ++ By solving the household problem it is straightforward to 










So it is clear that with GHH preferences the hours of work do not differ across agents when these 
have the same level of efﬁ  ciency. Substituting this expression in the utility function (1) and in the 



















(5)  That is, that preferences are such that conditions for Gorman aggregation are satisﬁ  ed.
(6)  These preferences are the ones used in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988).
(7)  The qualitative result on equity is maintained with different preference representations.Spring 2010  |  Articles










































As   , it i CC = i.e. transformed consumption is constant over time.8 In this case the budget con-
straint for household i, given by equation (5), allows for the determination of the optimal level of  i C  
for every household i as a function of the net wages path, the international real interest rate, the inter-
est rate at time zero and its level of labor efﬁ  ciency and of initial wealth.
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∑ (7)
The general equilibrium of this economy depends on the compatibility of the ﬁ  rm's and of the different 
household's decisions. Firms are very simple entities in this economy that, in each period, hire labor 
and rent capital goods to, given the technology, produce the unique good. Every ﬁ  rm uses the same 
technology and are price takers in every market where they operate.
We will deﬁ  ne the status quo as the situation where public goods are ﬁ  nanced uniquely by taxes on 
labor and capital income. We will compare this equilibrium with the one that would result from the 
elimination of capital taxation, increasing the tax on labor income such that the same ﬂ  ow of govern-
ment consumption can be ﬁ  nanced.
As said before we use the method developed in Correia (1999). That is a very simpliﬁ  ed method 
when compared to the ones used in the literature with heterogeneous agents models. One of the 
hypothesis that allows for that simpliﬁ  cation is the choice of preferences which, through households 
heterogeneity, allows for the existence of the so-called "representative household".9 The separability 
between aggregate and individual equilibrium is feasible given the described hypothesis: the type of 
preferences, households being price takers in the market and being anonymous to the government.
(8)  Given the isoelastic preferences described in (4) and since the international real interest rate is at the steady state level,  1 1 r β
∗ =− , then   , it i CC =  
i.e., the transformed consumption is constant over time.
(9)  That is the aggregate equilibrium, namely equilibrium prices, can be computed independently of the distribution of initial wealth Aio or the distribution of 
labor efﬁ  ciency Ei as well as of the distribution that results from the equilibrium.Articles  |  Spring 2010
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The effect of policy changes on equity is measured through the effects on welfare distribution. Using 
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ϕ−  and in Aio. This property is essential for the 
comparison of the welfare distribution's associated with each ﬁ  scal policy.
The interpersonal utility comparison has raised always questions due the cardinality that is neces-
sary to proceed to that comparison. In this work we minimize that problem by using as a measure of 
the welfare of household i the index 
1
1 , i i vU
σ − =  which measures the consumption (transformed) of 
that household. In this case to compare the utility between two households i and j the ratio  . ij υυ is 
computed. This ratio has a clear interpretation since it can be read as the consumption ratio across 
households, transformed by the labor desutility. The value of this ratio is the answer to the question: 
how much should be the growth of households j consumption, such that household i would be indif-
ferent between their position in the welfare distribution? The reason for defending that we are mini-
mizing the cardinality problem in the interpersonal welfare comparison is that the units chosen allow 
to interpret this relative position as a consumption equivalent.
To order the different policy regimes by equity it is equivalent to compare vectors of utility across 
households. We compare those vectors using the concept of relative differentials.10 Then policy 1 
dominates policy 2 if and only if the consumption increase (in percentage) of the poorer household, 
needed for the richer agent to change positions with him, is lower in policy 1 than in policy 2. In this 
way the choice of the household utility indicator and the criterion for comparing distributions comple-
ment each other.
3. ELIMINATION OF THE CAPITAL INCOME TAX
The objective of this article is to determine in which conditions the elimination of the tax on capital 
income, when compensated by an increase of the labor tax, improves equity in the small open econo-
my. Then we should compare the welfare distribution of households in policy 1, where the economy is 
characterized by a constant positive tax rate on capital, with the alternative situation, policy 2, where 
the economy is characterized by a zero tax rate on capital.11 In Correia (1996) we prove that policy 
(10) Policy 1 is equity improving in relation to policy 2 iff policy 1 dominates policy 2 in relative differential,  12 , rd vv   iff:
12
12
    
,





smaller utility than household
vv
vv
for any household i
aj
>
  The relative differential dominance is equivalent to the Lorenz dominance for any partition of the distribution support.
(11) In this case we maintain the tax on capital income in period zero, since this is a lump sum tax.Spring 2010  |  Articles
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1 is the second best solution. Then, policy 2 is always more efﬁ  cient than policy 1, i.e. the utility of 
the representative agent is higher in 2 than in 1. The effect on efﬁ  ciency, or the effect on utility of the 
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where x1 and x2 represent respectively the equilibrium values of variable x associated respectively 
to policy 1 and to policy 2.
As the tax on capital income is constant in both experiments for t ≥ 1 the non-arbitrage condition and 




N  and therefore the marginal productivity of 
labor, is constant for t ≥ 1. As the labor tax is also constant over time for every policy, we can guar-
antee that the net wage is constant over time, for policy 1 and for policy 2, for t ≥ 1.
For t=0 and using the optimum conditions of ﬁ  rms, that equate the wage paid (before taxes) to the 
























If we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, where α represents the capital share, we can 
write labor decisions as:
(1 )
00 (1 )(1 ) rr n ii NK
ϕα α χϕ τ α
−− =− −
As  1, ϕ >  then  (1 ) 0, ϕα −− > and since 
2
n τ >
1, n τ  then 
21
00 rr ii NN <
 and 
21





N increases with the higher tax on labor. By assumption 
12
00 . kk ττ =  Therefore 
we can state that:13
Result 1: The elimination of the tax rate on capital income, accompanied by an increase of the labor 
tax, implies that the net real interest rate in period 0 declines, i.e.
21
00 rr < .
(12)  F(K,N) represents the technology and Fi represents the parcial derivative of F relative to the i argument. Then F2 represents the marginal productivity 
of labor.
(13)  Note that the net return on capital is given by  []
1 (1 ) ( / ) , rr ki i KN α τα δ − −−  where δ  represents the depreciation rate.Articles  |  Spring 2010
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Using (10) result 1 implies:

















These two results explain that, for the representative agent, utility increases not due to the return on 
capital, which declines, but due to the net present value of human capital, which increases although 
being taxed at a higher rate.
To understand how different households are affected differently  we order households by increasing 
transformed consumption, or utility. If i > j, agent i is richer, that is it has a higher utility than agent 
j. Then to compare policy 1 with policy 2 in terms of equity we use, as described before, the relative 
differential concept:14
Deﬁ  nition: Policy 2 is equity improving in relation to policy 1 iff policy 2 dominates policy 1 in relative 













To determine the effect on equity of the elimination of the tax on capital income let us consider two 
extreme cases: One where households differ just due to labor efﬁ  ciency, i.e.  , r io i o AA =  and in 
the other households have identical efﬁ  ciency levels  1, r ii EE ==  and heterogeneity comes from 
different initial levels of non-human wealth.
Note that the deﬁ  nition of   , i C  given in (7) depends on the sum of two items: one that is homogene-
ous across households and the other is heterogeneous. 
Using (7), we check whether condition (12) is satisﬁ  ed, after the results 1 and 2. When heterogeneity 




















On the other side when heterogeneity is caused by different initial stocks of ﬁ  nancial wealth, condition 
(12) implies the opposite condition, that is: 
(14) This concept was developed by Marshall and Olkin (1979). It is equivalen to a ﬁ  rst-order stochastic dominance criteria, for any sub-groups of the popula-
tion.Spring 2010  |  Articles
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Therefore we can state that:
Result 3: The effect on equity of the elimination of the tax on capital depends crucially on the roots of 
heterogeneity across households: is equity worsening when agents differ on labor efﬁ  ciency and, on 
the contrary, is equity improving when agents differ by the initial stock of ﬁ  nancial wealth.
We can easily interpret result 3 in the following way. Individual welfare depends on two items: the 
present value of a function of net wages, which by result 2 increases with the elimination of capital 
taxation, and the initial wealth of every agent evaluated at  0 (1 ), r +  which by result 1 declines with 
the change of policy. In the extreme cases described in result 3, depending on the characterization 
of households, either the ﬁ  rst or the second parcel is homogeneous across households. So, in the 
case where agents differ by labor efﬁ  ciency, the ﬁ  rst parcel is heterogeneous across households and 
the second is homogeneous . The opposite occurs when agents are differentiated exclusively by the 
initial stock of ﬁ  nancial wealth.
Therefore, in this environment, the effect of the elimination of capital taxation on equity depends 
completely on the roots of households heterogeneity. Then the question proposed is an empirical 
one: what is the root of the households heterogeneity observed in most industrialized or emerg-
ing countries? Cross section data tells us that both wealth and earnings are not equally distributed 
across households. We can show,15 using general characteristics of empirical evidence, that the 
joint distribution of those two household' characteristics, labor efﬁ  ciency and initial wealth, satisfy the 
necessary conditions for:
Result 4: The elimination of capital income in a small open economy, inhabited by households char-
acterized by asymmetries compatible with empirical cross section evidence, leads to an improvement 
in equity. Any household with welfare lower than the one of the representative household of the 
economy increases welfare due to that policy change.
The last part of this result comes from using together the increase of efﬁ  ciency and the improvement 







 increases, then the utility of 
household i the poorer, increases necessarily more than the utility of the representative agent.
The question is now to understand how can these results and the opposite one described in Garcia-
Mila et al. (2001) coexist.
(15) For details see Correia (2010).Articles  |  Spring 2010
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4. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXOGENOUS REAL INTEREST RATE
The environment in which the exercise of last section was developed was the one of a small open 
economy with perfect capital mobility, while Garcia-Mila et al. calibrate their model for the US, which 
is described as usual by a closed economy model. How does this change of environment revert 
the results on equity in a such a strong way? The fundamental difference is that in the environment 
described until now the real interest rate was exogenous to policy. That is it did not react to the elimi-
nation of capital taxation. While in Garcia-Mila et al. the real interest rate is a variable that reacts to 
policy, due to the changes in saving and investment associated to the change in taxation. The same 
would occur if, even when considering a small open economy, we would assume that the rest of the 
world, composed by a set of identical small open economies, was changing policy in a similar way 
and simultaneously to the speciﬁ  c small open economy under study.
In this section we question result 4. How should it change when the economy is represented by a 
closed economy, that is one economy where the path for the real interest rate would react to the 
change of policy. The environment is identical to the one developed in section 1.1, except for capital 
immobility and goods nontradability which implies that, in every period, market clearing imposes that 
the sum of private consumption, public consumption and investment has to be equal to the production 
realized in the economy. This change, which is equivalent to the real interest rate being endogenous 
to policy in this economy, implies that, contrary to the former model which was analyzed analytically, 
now we have to use a numerical solution method for the computation of the equilibrium. We use the 
calibration as in Correia (1999). That is,  .5 k τ = 16 and  .23, n τ =  which are consistent with 
.25 N =  and  / .19, GY =  Preferences are such the  1.8, ϕ = 2.34, χ = 1.001 σ =                        
and  .96. β =  The technology is Cobb Douglas, the share of capital is 0.4 and depreciation is 10%.     
The following table summarizes the information that results from the computed equilibria, and which 
is necessary for the present analysis:
λ γ
 Policy  1  τk = .5, τn = .23  1 3.7
 Policy  2 τ k = 017, τn = .35       1.02  2.9  
λ is the welfare of the representative household relative to its welfare with policy 1. That is the efﬁ  -
ciency gain of the elimination of capital taxation is positive and for the chosen calibration it represents 
an increase of 2% in the utility of the representative household. The effect on equity is still measured 
by the effect on the value of human wealth and on the value of non-human wealth. The ratio of these 
two values is given by γ.18
(16) Note that this tax is on capital income net of depreciation.
(17) Except for period zero, where is 50%.
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It is immediate to see that, contrary to what happens in the small open economy, the value of γ 
declines with the elimination of capital taxation.19 The transition to the new steady state is now char-
acterized by an increasing capital/ labor ratio, therefore by an increasing path of wages and a de-
creasing path of interest rates. When compared with the case when there is no transition, the path of 
wages is now always lower and the path of interest rates always higher. Both contribute to a change 
of γ of different sign from the change in the small open economy. The incentives to save and invest 
more are identical to the ones in the small open economy. But now to increase the capital stock it 
is necessary to sacriﬁ  ce signiﬁ  cativelly consumption. This implies that capital accumulation is now 
realized at a much more gradual way over time. Therefore wages do not increase so much as before, 
the incentive to work more is lower and labor taxation has to increase more. On the other hand the 
slow increase of investment and the immediate elimination of capital taxation implies a higher return 
on capital than the one observed over time for the small open economy.
This result conﬁ  rms, partially, the conclusions in Garcia-Milá et al. (2001):
Result 5: The elimination of capital taxation in a closed economy, inhabited by heterogeneous house-
holds whose distribution of characteristics is consistent with cross-section evidence, implies a more 
unequal economy.
The effect of the change of policy over the poorest depend now on the speciﬁ  c distribution of the 
economy under study. Namely we need to know the distance across those poorest and the repre-
sentative household of the economy. As we know that the representative household increase wel-
fare by 2% and that poorest families increase distance relatively to the representative household 
we cannot say what happens to welfare of poorest without knowing its distance or its idiosyncratic 
characteristics.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We show in this article that the effect on equity of the elimination of the tax rate on capital income, 
when compensated by an increase of labor taxation, depends in a crucial way on the effect that the 
change of policy has on the path of the real interest rate. When we analyzed a small open economy 
where that rate is exogenous to policy the result is that the poorest households of the economy in-
crease welfare as a result of the change of policy.
When this change of policy is also implemented by other economies that belong to the international 
capital market, the real interest rate reacts to the change of policy and the result is the one described 
for the closed economy. Here the effect on equity is reversed. This may explain why, contrary to what 
should be expected by ﬁ  scal competition, we have observed during the last two decades a slight de-
cline of capital taxation. Maybe policy decision makers are benevolent, or maybe that the hypothesis 
that, though moved by different incentives, they reach the desirable goals is not so far from reality.
(19) This decline is robust to different preferences, for example the same effect  is obtained with preferences isoelactic in consumption and leisure.Articles  |  Spring 2010
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